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i9OO the average income of the attorneys of law a wide divergence of opinion appears highly
the city did not exceed $750. But even plac- improbable, if not quite impossible. Yet, there is,
ing it at the more liberal amount of $i,ooo, it is perhaps no clause in the Constitution which has
been so prolific of litigation and far-reaching deci-plain that at least 2,000 of the members of the sions as the contract clause. The term contract has
legal profession in Chicago do not make as on the one hand been strictly limited in definition
much as the income of a brick mason under to the most narrow conception of private law in
the union scale. It is estimated that perhaps order to meet the requirements of an intensely par-
six or eight lawyers in Chicago average ticularistic theory of constitutional interpretation;on the other hand, it has been extended, by a court
$40,000 a year, while a large number touch the national in sentiments, far beyond its ordinary
$30,000 mark. A considerable number, who meanings to offer a much needed protection to
count themselves among the successful, make vested rights. It has been developed along lines
between $io,ooo and $2o,ooo a year, while the exhibiting no settled principles of judicial exposi-
tion, but has suffered rather a process of expansionattorney who can figure up $5,000 a year is by and contraction according as one or the other of
no means to be (despised. This leaves a start- the two conflicting doctrines of our constitutional
lingly smn311 amount as the average income of law has preponderated in the deliberations of the
the less fortunate half of the legal profession. Supreme Court.
And all this increase in the number of lawyers Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, which expressly places the protection ofis in spite of the fact that it is very much more private property in the Federal government, many
difficult to secure admission to the bar at pres- cases, which before, upon questionable principles of
ent than it was a few years ago. According to contract law, but upon undoubtedly sound principles
the Tribune, the conditions which prevail in of political science, might have been brought within
Chicago are duplicated all over the country. the purview of the clause under discussion, are now
properly decided under that amendment. It is noIn 1870, the total ntimber of regularly enrolled longer necessary, in order to restrain a State from
law students in the United States was 1,653. confiscation of property rights, to have recourse
In 189o, they numbered no less than 11,874. to the contract clause. It seems fair to say, then,
In the last-named year the total number of that the extremes to which the definition of a con-
graduates from law schools was 3,140 or tract will be extended, have for the most part been
reached, and that from now on, the court, relievednearly twice a s many as were enrolled thirty of the necessity of following doubtful precedents,
years before. It is apparent, therefore, that and of creating anomalous innovations, will con-
while the difficulties of securing admission to confine itself more strictly to the application of the
the bar have increased many fold within the law of contractual obligations in determining the
last quarter of a century, the number of gradu- existence of a contract within the meaning of the
Constitution.ates has more than kept pace with it. Tie The study of the cases themselves suggests, per-
difficulty of making a living, to say nothing haps, the most logical, as well as the most con-
about amassing a competency under condi- venient method of treating the subject. It will be
tions such as we have described, is apparent at taken uip under the following topics: (i) Parties to
a glance; any bright young man can figure out the contract; (2) Grants of land; (3) Charters andfranchises; (4) A contract distinguished from anfor himself his chances. Yet, with all these office; (5) Quasi-contracts; (6) Marriage; and (7)
facts before them, the ambitious young men of State constitutions.
the country persist in crowding the law schools
to a greater extent every year.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONTRACT?
By W.%. UND)ERHIILL MOORE.
The significance of the term " contract," as em-
ployed in article i, section io of the Constitution of
the United States which provides that no State shall
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
seems at first blush, so obvious, that a discussion of
its real import would be declared more likely to con-
fuse than to enlighten. To the student of private
Parties to the Contract.
Under the head of parties to the contract, it seems
hardly necessary to say more than that any contract,
the parties to which are persons capable of enter-
ing into contractual obligations at common law, is
within the meaning of the Constitution. The con-
tract may be between a state in its corporate capa-
city and an individual or several individuals. Thus,
in Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch. 136 [I8io]), in which
case it was held that a grant of land from a State
to a private party was within the contract clause,
Chief Justice Marshall said: " If, under a fair con-
struction of the Constitution, grants are compre-
hended tinder the term ' contract,' is a grant from
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the State excluded from the operation of the pro- stated in the books as to have become almost an
vision? Is the clause to be considered as inhibiting axiom of our public law. However, when the
the State from impairing the obligation of con- anomalous character of any rule of constitutional
tracts between individuals, but as excluding from law, which classes grants as contracts, is considered
that inhibition contracts made with itself? The for a moment, the necessity of a careful review of
words themselves contain no such distinction. the earlier cases becomes obvious.
They are general, and are applicable to contracts of In Fletcher v. Peck (6 Cranch. 87 [18mo]), the first
every description" (see, also, cases cited in topics case which brought the contract clause directly be-
2, 3 and 4, infra). fore the Supreme Court, it appears that the legisla-
Again the contract may be between two States as ture of Georgia had authorized the sale of a large
in Green v. Biddle (8 Wheaton I [1823]) and Haw- tract of land, and that a grant was made by letters
kins v. Barney (5 Peters, 457 [1831]). In both of patent to the Georgia company. Fletcher held a
these cases the dispute arose in regard to certain leed from Peck for a part of this land, under a title
land ceded by Virginia to Kentucky, upon the derived from the patent; and in the deed Peck coy-
formation of the latter State, under an agreement enanted that the letters patent from the State of
whereby Kentucky bound herself in her Constitu- Georgia were lawfully issued, and that the title had
tion not to destroy rights vested under the laws not since been legally impaired. The question arose
of Virginia before the separation. The Supreme as to the constitutionality of an act of the legisla-
Court of the United States held that this agree- ture of Georgia which repealed the law under which
ment between the States was a contract and that the letters patent were issued, and declared them
any law of Kentucky violating the compact was void null and void. The court held that the law, under
under the Constitution of the United States as in- which the letters patent were authorized, was in
pairing the obligation of contracts. the nature of an executed contract, and absolute
It seems, too, from a late case that the United rights having vested tnder that contract, a subse-
States may be a party to a contract with a State of quent act of the legislattre attempting to invalidate
the Union (Walsh v. Columbus, etc., R. R. Co., 176 those rights was unconstitutional, as impairing the
U. S. 479 [1899]). In Walsh v. Columbus, etc., R. R. obligation of contracts. The grant from the State
it appears that congress had passed an act in which of Georgia was a contract within the Constitution,
it was provided that certain lands should be granted for a grant amounts to an extinguishment of the
to Ohio, if that State wotld accept them and agree right of the grantor, and implies a contract not to
to use them for canals, over which the United reassert that right.
States should have free transportation. The propo- It seems clear that what the court was really
sition was accepted by an appropriate act of the doing in this case was protecting vested rights of
Ohio legislature. Subsequently the use of the lands property, but not true contract rights. As a matter
in question was granted by the State to the defend- of principle nothing could be further from a con-
ant, and the plaintiff, a private person, brings this tract than a grant. Under a contract the promisee
action on the ground that the law granting to the gets simply a right in persottam against his prom-
defendant the privilege of use of the land for rail- issor, a right which exists merely because of the
road purposes, was a law impairing the obligation relation the parties have assumed towards one
of contracts. It was held that although a contract another. By virtue of a grant, however, the grantee
existed between the United States and Ohio in re- gets no greater rights against his grantor than he
gard to the land, the plaintiff, not being a party to gets against the whole world; he acqtires under a
it, had no cause to complain of a breach. Mr. Jus- grant a right in rem, existing, not because of his
tice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the court, relation to any person, but because of his relation to
said: " The plaintiff stands in no position to take a particular thing which he has acquired under the
advantage of a default of the State in this particular. I grant. A grant is a means of transferring already
He was not a party to the contract between the existing rights while a contract creates new rights.
State and the federal government; his rights are Therefore, in Fletcher v. Peck, when the grantees
entirely subsidiary to those of the government; and of the State acquired a fee simple estate in the
if the latter chose to acquiesce in the abandonment property in question, they got an estate which bore
of the canals, as it seems to have done, he has no no single peculiar characteristic because it was
right to complain. The only contract in this case granted immediately from the State, and there was
was between the State of Ohio and the United no more a contract on the part of Georgia not to
States. Plaintiff was neither a party nor privy to reassert a right of ownership in respect to this prop-
such a contract. It was within the power of the erty, than there was a similar contract in respect to
government to prosecute the State for breach of it, every parcel of land within the State.
or to condone stch breach if it saw fit." But it is to be remembered that between 1798,
when it was decided in the case of Calder v. Bull
Grants of Land. (3 Dallas, 387 [I798]), that the prohibition in the
That a grant of land, either from a State to an Constitution against ex post facto laws (art. i, see.
individual, or from one individual to another, is a io) was directly only against legislation as to crimes,
contract within the Constitution, has been so often and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
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there was absolutely nothing in the United States
Constitution to prevent the State legislatures from
wholesale confiscation of property, unless the con-
tract clause was construed so as to accomplish that
result. It seems then, that the court was justified as
a matter of public policy, in resorting to the fiction
of calling a grant an executed contract.
It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection,
that in the early decades of the last century, before
the tremendous influence of French revolutionary
thought had begun to disappear, and while men's
minds were still hopelessly tangled in the social
compact theory, the statement that all property
rights were the result of contract, would have been
considered in no wise as extraordinary. Thus, in
Calder v. Bull (3 Dallas, 394), Mr. Justice Chase
said: " It seems to me that the right of property, in
the origin, could only arise from compact cxpress, or
While the lease was still in existence Satterlee ac-
quired a title to the land under a grant from Penn-
sylvania and in an action of ejectment brought by
Matthewson, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that inasmuch as the relation of landlord and
tenant could not exist between Pennsylvania and
Connecticut claimants, Satterlee was not estopped to
deny his landlord's title, and was, therefore, entitled
to the land in question. The legislature of Penn-
sylvania then passed anact declaring that such a re-
lation might exist between Pennsylvania and Con-
necticut claimants, and iunder this statute Satterlee
was deprived of the premises. The case was
brought to the Supreme Court of the United States
on the ground that the act of the Pennsylvania legis-
lature impaired the obligation of the contract be-
tween that State and Satterlee, its grantee. It was
held, however, that such was not the case, the law
implied, and I think it is the better opinion, that the in question not in terms revoking the grant to
right, as well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring Satterlee. The court recognized Fletcher v. Peck,
property, and of alienating or transferring, inherit- but limited its application to statutes actually re-
ing or transmitting it, is conferred by society." voking grants of land. Mr. Justice Washington, in
In the same case, and following up the same line delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The
of thought, Mr. Justice Chase clearly pointed out objection, however, which was most pressed upon
the way for the decision in Fletcher v. Peck (supra). the court, and relied upon by the counsel for the
In arguing that the ex post facto clause was intended plaintiff in error, was, that the effect of this act was
only as a restraint on criminal legislation, lie said to divest rights which were vested by law in Satter-
(3 Dallas, 390): "I do not think it is inserted to lee. There is certainly no part of the Constitution
secure the citizen in his private rights, of either prop- of the United States which applies to a State law of
erty or contracts. The prohibitions not to make that description; nor are we aware of any decision
anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of of this or of any circuit court, which has con-
debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obliga- dentned such a law upon this ground; provided its
tion of contracts, were inserted to secure private effect be not to impair the obligation of a contract."
rights. * * * If the prohibition against making In another case, 'Wilkinson v. Leland (2 Peters,
ex post facto laws were intended to secure personal 627 [1829]), which came up for decision in the same
rights from being affected, or injured, by such laws, year as Satterlee v. Matthewson (supra), the
and the prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that Supreme Court maintained the validity of a State
object, the other restraints I have enumerated, were statute which ratified a void sale of land by an
unnecessary and. therefore, improper." executrix, and thereby divested the devisees of the
The doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck (supra), was title to the land which had vested in them upon the
followed and applied to two cases, presenting sub- death of the testator.
stantially the same state of facts as that case, which These two cases seem to have settled the law, and
arose about five years later (Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Mr. Justice Baldwin, in delivering his opinion in
Cranch. 43, and Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch. Bennett v. Boggs (I Baldwin, 74 [183O]), well sums
292 [1815]); but before the court had an opportunity up the state of the law before the adoption of the
to extend this doctrine to its logical conclusion, I Fotrteenth Amendment: " The Supreme Court
and hold that all vested property rights were within have decided, Satterlee v. Matthewson (2 Peters,
the protection of the contract clause, the particular- 412-414), that a State law, though an unwise and
istic theories in regard to the federal system of gov- Unjust exercise of legislative power- retrospective
ernment, which so characterized the public law of in its operations- passed in the exercise of judicial
the thirty years or so preceding the Rebellion, had I function - creating a contract between the parties to
gained such a foothold, that any invasion of a a pending suit where none existed previous to the
State's prerogative not clearly required by! law- declaring a contract in existence prior to the
precedent, or a literal interpretation of the Con- 'law, founded on an immoral or illegal consideration,
stitution was not to be expected. to be valid and binding on the parties - or divesting
Accordingly in Satterlee v. Matthewson (2 Peters, rights which were previously vested in one of the
380 [1829]), the Supreme Court refused to apply the parties - is neither cx post facto, a law impairing the
rule of Fletcher v. Peck (supra) to a state of facts obligation of contracts, or repugnant to the Consti-
which seems to be quite within the meaning of that tution of the United States" (accord: Watson v.
case. It appears that Satterlee was a tenant, under a [ercer, 8 Peters, ITO [1834]; Baltimore & Susque-
lease from Matthewson, of certain premises, the fee hanna R. R. Co. v. Nesbit, to Howard, 395 [1850]).
to which 'Matthewson had under a Connecticut title. After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
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however, the question how far a grant of land may
be considered a contract within the Constitution,
has become of little practical importance. Any
attempt on the part of a State to annul grants or to
confiscate property rights would now be met by
the provision of that amendment, that no State shall
deprive a person of property without due process of
law, and it is no longer necessary to resort to a
fiction in order to protect an individual in his
vested rights of property.
Charters and Franchises.
The leading case of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward (4 Wheaton, 518 [i819]), decided that the char-
ter of a private corporation constituted in itself a
contract within the meaning of the Constitution,
and protected by it. The argument by which the
Supreme Court reached this conclusion is summed
up in the opinion of Mr. Justice Washingt6n, as
follows: "To this grant, or this franchise, the par-
ties are, the king, and the persons for whose benefit
it is created, or trustees for them. The assent of
both is necessary. The subjects of the grant are not
only privileges and immunities, but property, or
which is the same thing, a capacity to acquire and to
hold property in perpetuity. Certain obligations are
created, binding both on the grantor and the
grantees. On the part of the former, it amounts to
an extinguishment of the king's prerogative to
bestow the same identical franchise on another cor-
porate body, because it would prejudice his prior
grant. It implies, therefore, a contract not to re-
assert the right to grant the franchise to another, or
to impair it" (4 Wheaton, 657).
The doctrine of the Dartmouth College case
(supra) has become so thoroughly settled in the
jurisprudence of the United States that anything
more than a few examples of its application seems
unnecessary. In The Binghamton Bridge (3 Wal-
lace. 51 [1865]), it appears that the legislature of New
York had granted a charter to a corporation, in
which charter the corporation was authorized to
build and maintain a bridge. The charter stipulated
that it should not be lawful for any other persons
to erect a bridge within two miles of the bridge
erected by the corporation. After the bridge had
been built some years, the legislature passed an act
incorporating the Binghamton Bridge Company,
which company, in accordance with the provisions
of its charter, constructed a bridge a few rods away
from the first bridge. It was held that the act incor-
porating the Binghamton Bridge Company was voit
as impairing the contract existing between the first
corporation and the State.
So. in New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers
(1I5 U. S. 674 [1885]), the same principle was applied.
It appears that the plaintiff had a charter granting
to it the exclusive privilege of supplying water in
the city of New Orleans. The Constitution of 1879
of Louisiana, abolished, in terms, all monopolistic
features in the charters of then existing corpora-
tions. except certain railroads; and in accordance
with this provision the defendant had procured a
city ordinance to be passed allowing him to supply
his hotel, situated in New Orleans, with water by
pipes laid direct to the Mississippi. It was held that
the charter to the plaintiff, giving him the exclusive
privilege of supplying water within the city, was a
contract within of the Constitution, and that in con-
sequence, the charter was irrepealable even by a
constitutional provision, and the ordinace in ques-
tion was void. (Accord: St. Tammany Water
Works Co. v. New Orleans Water Works Co., I2o
U. S. 64 [I886]; New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., II5 U. S. 650 [1885]. See, also, Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 [I893]).
In Wilmington R. R. v. Reid (13 Wallace, 266
[1870] ), after a review of the cases, Mr. Justice Davis
thus commented upon the law in respect to charters:
It has so often been decided by this court that a
charter of incorporation granted by a State creates
a contract between the State and the corporators,
which the State cannot violate, that it would be
supererogation to repeat the reasons on which the
argument is founded. * * * If the contract is
plain and unambiguous, and the meaning of the
parties to it can be clearly ascertained, it is the duty
of the court to give effect to it the same as if it were
a contract between private persons, without regard
to its supposed injurious effects upon the public
interests."
However, the courts have refused to extend the
doctrine any further than necessary, and, unless an
exclusive privilege is expressly granted, another
franchise for precisely the same privilege may be
granted, although this second grant, for all practi-
cal purposes, destroys the first. Thus in Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (it Peters, 576
[1837]) it was held that inasmuch as the grant
to a toll bridge company did not, in terms, import
an exclusive grant, there was nothing to prevent
the State from authorizing a free bridge to be built
within a few rods of the company's bridge, although
the erection of the free bridge destroyed absolutely
the value of the franchise to maintain the toll
bridge. The court placed its decision on the ground
that the law authorizing the free bridge did not
purport to repeal the earlier franchise, nor to alter
it in any material or immaterial part.
In the Turnpike Company v. State of Maryland
(3 Wallace, 213 [1865]), in which case it was held
that the State might charter a railroad company,
giving it the right to build so near to a turnpike,
previously constructed tinder a franchise from the
State, as to effectually extinguish all benefits accru-
ing tinder the earlier franchise, the court said:
"The difficulty of the argument in behalf of the
turnpike company, and which lies at the foundation
of the defense is, that there is no contract in the
charter of the turnpike company that prohibited the
legislature from authorizing the construction of
tie rival railroad. No exclusive privileges had been
conferred upon it, either in express terms, or by
necessary implication ; and ience whatever may
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however, the question ho far a 'grant of lan may
be considered a contract within the Constitution,
has become of little practical importance. n
attempt on the part of a State to annul grants or to
confiscate property rights would no be et b
the provision of that amendment, that no State shall
deprive a person of property ithout due process of
law, and it is no longer necessary to resort to a
fiction in order to protect an individual in his
vested rights of property.
Charters alld ranchises.
The leading case of art outh ollege v. -
ward (4 heaton, 518 [1819]), decided that t e char-
ter of a private corporation constituted i itself a
contract, within the eaning of the onstit ti ,
and protected by it. he argu ent i th
Supreme Court reached this conclusion is s
up in the opinion of r. Justice ashington, as
follows: "To this grant, or this franchise, t r-
ties are, the king, and the persons for se fit
it is created, or trustees for the . The assent of
both is necessary. The subjects of the grant are not
only privileges and immunities, but property, r
which is the same thi'ng, a capacity to acquire and t
hold property in perpetuity. ertain li ati s r
created, binding both on the grantor and the
grantees. On the part of the for er, it a ounts to
an extinguishment of the king's prerogative t
bestow the same identical franchise on another cor-
porate body, because it would prejudice his prior
grant. It implies, therefore, a contract not to re-
assert the right to grant the franchise to another, r
to impair it" (4 heaton, 657).
The doctrinc of the art outh ollege s
(supra) has become so thoroughly settled in the
jurisprudence of the United States that anything
more than a few examples of its application see s
unnecessary. In The Bingha ton ridge (3 al-
lace. 51 [1865]), it appears that the legislature of e
York had granted a charter to a corporation, i
which charter the corporation was authorized to
build and maintain a bridge. The charter stipulated
that it should not he lawful for any other persons
to erect a bridge within two iles of the bridge
erected by the eorporation. After the bridge had
been built some years, the legislature passed an 'let
incorporating the Binghamton Bridgc o pany,
which company, in aceordance with the provisions
of its charter, constructed a bridge a fe rods a ay
from the first bridge. It was held that the 'let incor-
porating the Binghamton Bridge Co pany was voitl
as impairing the contract existing between the first
corporation and the State.
So. in New Orleans \;Yater orks Co, v. Rivers
(115 U. S. 674 [1885]), the same principle was applied.
It appears that the plaintiff had a charter granting
to it the exclttsive privilege of supplying water in
the city of New Orleans. The Constitution of 1879
of Louisiana. abolished, in terms, all monopolistic
features in the charters of then existing corpora-
tions. except certain railroads; and in accordance
with this provision the defendant had procured a
city ordinance to be passed al owing hi to supply
his hotel, situat in New Orleans, with water b
pipes laid direct to the ississippi. It as held that
the charter to the plaintiff, giving hi the exc1 sin
privile e of supplyi water it i the cit ; as a
co tr within of the Constituti , and that in c
sequence, the charter was irrepeal l eve by a
c stit provision, and th ordi e in ques-
ti was oid. ( ccord: St. ' a t r
\V r o. v. e rle ater or Co., 1 0
. . 64 [1 rl . v. Louisi
i ., 115 . S. 65 [1 See, als , ri
. v. e t 154 . S. [1 ]). .
I il i . . . ei (1 allac , 26
[ ), aft r a r i of the , r. J sti i
t c u th l in r t c rt r :
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ll ri ge i t
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s 's i , lthough
i e ridge troyed l tely
l f ise t in t e t ll
e t laced ision the r und
la thorizing ree i e id t
rt to repeal the lier franchise, r to lter
i terial r i aterial part.
In e rnpike o pany . te f ryland
(3 allace, [1865]), in ich ase it as eld
that the tate i t arter a ilroad ,
giving it t e right to build so near to a turnpike,
previously constructed under a franchise fro t e
State, as to effectua ly tinguish a l benefits accru-
ing u er the earlier franchise, the court said:
"The ifficulty f the argument in behalf of the
turnpike co pany, and which lies at the foundation
of the defense is, that there is no contract in the
charter of the turnpike company that prohibited the
legislature from authorizing the construction of
the rival railroad. No exclusive privileges had been
confe red upon it, either in expre s terms, or by
nece sary implication; and hence whatever ay
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have been the general injurious effects and conse- Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City, iii U. S.
quences to the company from the construction and 746 [1883] ; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 [1876]).
operation of the rival road, they are simply mis- Nor is a contract created by the issuance of a
fortunes which may excite our sympathies, but are license to do business, even if the license be granted
not the subject of legal redress." upon consideration, if the business concerned can
Moreover, if a special franchise be conferred upon possibly be regarded as one subject to regulation
a public or municipal corporation, it will not be con- under the police power of the State. Thus in
strued to be irrevocable. In East Hartford v. Hart- Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley (072 U. S. 621
ford Bridge Company (io Howard, 533 [1850]) the [1898]) it was held that a license granting to a
court held that an act of the Connecticut legislature foreign corporation the right to carry on an insur-
revoking a ferry franchise previously conferred ance business within a State, is revocable by that
upon the town of East Hartford, and granting it to State at any time it sees fit to exercise its preroga-
a bridge company was valid. The principle of the tive. Mr. Justice Peckham, in delivering the
decision was stated by Mr. Justice Woodbury in opinion of the court, said: "Having the right to
the opinion as follows: " The legislature was acting 1 impose such terms as it may see fit upon a corpora-
here on one part and public, municipal and political tion of this kind as a condition upon which it will
corporations on the other. They are acting, too, permit the corporation to do business within its
in relation to a public object, being virtually a high- borders, the State is not thereafter and perpetually
way across the river, over another highway up and confined to those conditions which it made at the
down the river. From the standing and relation of ,time that a foreign corporation may have availed
these parties, and from the subject-matter of their itself of the right given by the State, but it may
action, we think that the doings of the legislature ialter them at pleasure. In all such cases there can
as to this ferry must be considered rather as public be no contract springing from a compliance with
laws than as contracts. They related to public in- the terms of the act, and no irrepealable law, be-
terests. They changed as those interests demanded, cause they are what are termed 'governmental
The grantees, likewise, the towns being mere organi- objects,' and hence within the category which per-
zations for public purposes were liable to have their inuts the legislature of a State to legislate upon
public powers, rights and duties modified or abol- those subjects from time to time as the public
ished at any moment by the legislature." interests may seem to it to require" (see Gray v.Connecticut, 15 U. S. 73 [1895]).
But, by far, the most extensive and salutary The case of Newton v. Commissions (OO U. S.
limitation upon the power of a State legislature to 548 [879]) seems to snggest an extension of the
pass irrepealable laws, is that which denies them the 548 that a t o cannot a r te f t e
right to barter away their police power. A State principle that a State cannot barter away its police
powver by laying down the rule that any matter
cannot give tip its power to legislate in furtherance which may be considered properly of public interest,
of the public health and morals, be the charter ever or a public stbject as within the scope of internal
so irrevocable in form. Accordingly in Stone v. government, is within the police power. It was
Mississippi (ioI U. S. 821, et seq. [i88o]), it was held, in that case, that a lav whereby it was pro-
held that a lottery charter, although, in terms, to vided that upon the performance of certain condi-
run for a fixed period, and under which the grantor tions by the citizens of Canfield that the county
received certain annual dividends, was held to be seat of the county in which Canfield was situated,
repealable at any time. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, should be permanently established in that town,
in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "No was repealable at any time, even after the condi-
legislature can bargain away the public health or tions were completely fulfilled. If it is contended
the public morals-the supervision of both these that the establishment of county seats is not to be
subjects of government is continuing in its nature, classed as one of a State's police powers, the de-
and they are to be dealt with as the exigencies cision may then be readily supported on the
of the moment may require. Government is organ- broader ground that it is a governmental power
ized with a view to their preservation, and it cannot vested in the legislature by the Constitution of the
divest itself of the power to provide for them. * * * State, and, therefore, a power of which the legisla-
Anyone, therefore, who accepts a lottery *charter ture could not constitutionally divest itself.
does so with the implied understanding that the Notwithstanding the principle that a legislature
people in their sovereign " (governmental?) cannot lawfully divest itself of governmental func-
"capacity and through their properly-constituted tions which are vested in it by the Constitution of
agencies, may resume it at any time when the pub- the State, it has become a well-recognized rule that
lic good shall require, whether it be paid for or not a State may by contract bind itself not to exercise
paid for. * * " He has, in legal effect, nothing the power of taxation, or to exercise it only within
more than a license to enjoy the privilege on the certain limits. This anomalous doctrine seems to
terms named for the specified time, unless it be have originated in the case of New Jersey v. Wil-
sooner abrogated by the sovereign" (govern- son (7 Cranch, 164 [18if]). It was there held that
mental?) "power of the State" (Accord: Fertiliz- an act of the New Jersey legislature purporting to
ing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 [1878] ; repeal a law whereby it was stipulated that if cer-
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cannot give. up Its power to legislate 111 furtherance which may be considered properly of public interest,
of the public health and morals, ~e the charter ever or a public subject as within the scope of internal
so. i~re:oc.able in form. Accordlllgly in St?ne v. government, is within the police power. It was
MISSISSIPPi (101 U. S. 821, et seq. [1~O]), It was held, in that case, that a law whereby it was pro-
held that a lotter~ charter, althoug~, m terms, to vided that upon the performance of certain condi-
run .for a fixe~ penod, an~ ':1t1der wluch the grantor tions by the citizens of Canfield that the county
received certalll annual diVidends, was held to be seat of the county in which Canfield was situated,
repealable at any time. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, should be permanently established in that town,
in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "No was repealable at any time, even after the condi-
legislature can bargain away the public health or tions were completely fulfilled. If it is contended
the public morals - the supervision of both these that the establishment of county seats is not to be
subjects of government is continuing in its nature, classed as one of a State's police powers, the de-
and they are to be dealt with as the exigencies cision may then be readily supported on the
of the moment may require. Govern ent is organ- broader ground that it is a govern ental po er
ized with a view to their preservation, and it cannot vested in the legislature by the onstitution of the
di\'est itself of the power to provide for the . * * * State, and, therefore, a po er of hich the legisla-
Anyone, therefore, who accepts a lottery 'charter ture could not constitutionally divest itself.
does so with the implied understanding that the Notwithstanding the principle that a legislature
people in their sovereign" (governmental?) cannot lawfully divest itself of govern ental func-
"capacity and through their properly-constituted tions which are vested in it by the Constitution of
agencies, may resume it at any time when the pub- the State, it has become a well-recognized rule that
lic good shall require. whether it be paid for or not a State ay by contract bind itself not to exercise
paid for. ':' '" '" He has, in legal effect, nothing the power of taxation, or to exercise it only ithin
more than a license to enjoy the privilege on the certain limits. This anomalous doctrine see s to
ter s na ed for the specified ti e, unless it be have originated in the case of e Jersey . iI-
sooner abrogated by the sovereign" (govern- son (7 ranch, 164 [18II]). It as there held t at
ental?) "power of the State" ( ccord: Fertiliz- an act of the e Jersey legislature r rti g t
ing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 . S. 659 [1878]; repeal a la hereby it as stipulated t at if cer-
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tain Indians would give tip the lands they occupied, (Accord: Rector v. Philadelphia, 24 Howard, 3oo
other lands, which were conveyed to trustees for [i86o]; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wallace, 527 [1874];
their use, would be exempt from taxation, was held West Wisconsin Ry. v. Supervisors, 93 U. . 595
unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the [1876]).
contract between the State and the Indians. Although it is impossible to distinguish, as a
But the rule, in its operation, has been confined matter of principle, between the power of a State
almost exclusively to exemptions from taxation in- to grant away its right of eminent domain and its
cidental to the grant of corporate privileges. Thus power to grant an exemption from taxation, both
in Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire (20 Wallace, 42 being essentially governmental powers, the law is
[1873]) it was held that an exemption from taxa- well settled that a State cannot divest itself of the
tion contained in a charter to a railroad corporation right of eminent domain, nor create in an individual
was absolute and irrevocable by the State legislature, i a right against the future exercise of that power
Mr. Justice Hunt, in delivering the opinion of the upon the same property. Any law whereby it is
court, said: "The right of taxation is a sovereign attempted to barter away the right in question will
right, and, presumptively, belongs to the State in be treated by the courts as subject to withdrawal
regard to every species of property and to an un- at the pleasure of the government (Boom Co. v.
limited extent. The right may be waived in certain Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 [1878] ; see, also, Burgess,
instances, but this can only be done by a clear ex- Political Science and Constitutional Law, vol. i,
pression of the legislative will. The cases of 239. et seq.)
Tomlinson v. Branch (I 5 Wall. 469) and Tomlinson In the charters of banking corporations it is fre-
v. Jessup (Id. 454), in this court, show that when quently stipulated that the notes or bonds of the
a contract of exemption from taxation is thus estab- corporation shall be received by the State in pay-
lished, it is binding upon the State, and the action ment of taxes and debts. Thus in Woodruff v.
of the State in the passage of laws violating its Trapnall (io Howard, 5II [1850]), it appears that
terms will not be sustained" (Accord: New Jersey Kentucky had, in a law incorporating a bank, de-
v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 [1877] ; Farrington v. clared that all its bank bills should be receivable
Tennessee, Id. 679; Osborn v. Mobile, 16 Wallace, in payment of debts due the State. The section of
481 [1872] ; Humphrey v. Peques, Id. 247; Dodge v. the law relating to bills was repealable, and this
Woolsey, I8 Howard, 331 [1855]; Bank v. Knoop, case was an application for a writ of mandamus to
16 Howard, 369 [1853] ; Gordon v. Tax Court, compel the State treasurer to receive some of the
3 Howard, 133 [1845] ; Bank v. Skelly, i Black, bills in payment of a judgment. The bills tendered
436 [1862]; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309 had been issued before the repealing act, but it did
[1878]). not appear whether or not the relator had gotten
However, it is necessary to distinguish sharply the bills before the repeal. It was held that the
between cases where the exemption is held binding, statute in question constituted a contract between
there being a consideration upon which the contract the State and the holders of bills issued before the
can be based, and cases where the law offering the repeal, and the application was granted. Mr. Jns-
exemption is construed to be a mere gratuity, repeal- tice Davis, in commenting upon a substantially
able at any time. In Grand Lodge v. New Orleans similar state of facts in Furman v. Nichol (8
(166 U. S. 146 [1896]), it appears that the legisla- Wallace, 59-60 [1868]), said: "That this guarantee
ture of Louisiana had passed an act exempting the was until withdrawn by the State, a contract be-
hall of a certain Grand Lodge from taxation so tween the State and every noteholder of the bank,
long as it was occupied by a certain order of obliging the State to receive the notes for taxes,
Masons. The Masons were already in occupation cannot admit of serious question. * * * In such
of the hall when the law was passed, but, in reliance a transaction the benefit is mutual between the
upon this law, went to considerable expense in re- parties. The bank get the interest on the notes as
pairing the hall. It was held that inasmuch as the long as they are unredeemed, and the holder of
law provided in no way for an acceptance of its the bills has a ready and convenient mode of paying
terms, and since, therefore, it could not be said taxes. The State did, therefore, in the charter
that there was a consideration, the exemption was a creating the bank of Tennessee, on good considera-
bounty, revocable at will. Mr. Justice Brown said: tion, contract with the billholders to receive from
"If the act of i855 be regarded as a contract within them the paper of the bank for all taxes they owed
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), the State. Until the legislature, in some proper
then it is clear that the exemption from taxation way, notifies the public that the guarantee thus
was valid and beyond the power of the legislature furnished has been withdrawn, such contract is
to abrogate. * * * To make such a contract, binding upon the State and within the protection
however, there is the same necessity for a considera- of the Constitution of the United States. * * *
tion that there would be if it were a contract be- The guarantee is in no sense a personal one. It
tween private parties. If the law be a mere offer attaches to the note-is part of it, as much so as
of a bounty, it may be withdrawn at any time, not- if written on the back of it-goes with the note
withstanding the recipients of such bounty may everywhere, and invites everyone who has taxes
have incurred expense upon the faith of such offer" to pay to take it."
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tain Indians would give up the lands they occupied, I ( ccord: Rector v. Philadelphia, 24 Ho ard, 300
other lands, which were conveyed to trustees for I [1860]; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 allace"527 [ ];
their use, would be exempt fro taxation, as held I est isconsin . v. Super is r , 93 U. S. 595
unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the I [1876]).
contract between the State and the Indians. ,Although it is i possible to distinguish, as a
But the rule, in its operation, has been confined, atter of principle, et ee the p r of a t t
almost exclusively to exemptions from taxation in- ! to grant a ay its right f e i e t do ai an it
cidental to the grant of corporate privileges. Thus' po er to grant an exe ption fr ta ati , t
in Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire (20 aJlace, 42 ibeing essentiaJly govern ental po ers, t e l is
[1873]) it was held that an exemption fro taxa- , eJl settled that a tate t di est it lf the
tion contained in a charter to a railroad corporation right of e inent do ain, r create in a i i i l
was absolute and irrevocable by the State legislature. i a right against the f t re e ercise f t t
Mr. Justice Hunt, in delivering the opinion of the I upon the sa e property. ny la r it i
court, said: "The right of taxation is a sovereign, atte pted t arter t ri t i iJ
right, and, presumptively, belongs to the State in I be treated t e c rts s j t t it l
regard to every species of property and to an un- at t e leas re f t r t .
limited extent. The right may be waived in certain Patterson, 98 . S. 403 [r878]; see, also, r ess,
instances, but this can only be done by a clear ex- Political Science a onstit ti al , l. I,
pression of the legislative ill. he cases f .. ct s .)
Tomlinson v. Branch (IS all. 4(9) and Tomlinson In the charters of ba~1king corporations it is fr -
v. Jessup (Id. 454), in this court, show that when quently stipulated that the notes or bonds f t
a contract of exemption from taxation is thus estab- corporation shaJl be received t t t i -
lished, it is binding upon the State, and the action ent of taxes and debts. s i r ff .
of the State in the passage of laws violating its 'rrapnaJl (10 o ard, SII [ ]), it r t t
terms will not be sustained" (Accord: New Jersey Kentucky had, in a la incorporating , -
v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 [1877]; Farrington v. c1ared that aJl its bank iJls s l r i l
Tennessee, ld. 679; Osborn v. obile, r6 aJlace. in pay ent of debts due the tate. e s ti f
48r [r872]; Humphrey v. Peques, Id. 247; odge v. the la relati t ills r l l ,
\Voolsey, r8 Howard, 331 [1855]; Bank v. Knoop, case was an application for a rit of anda us t
16 Howard, 369 [1853]; Gordon v. Tax ourt, co pel the tate treas rer t r i
3 Howard, 133 [1845]; Bank v. SkeJly, I Black, biJls in pay ent of a judg ent. e iJls t r
436 [r862]; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309 had been issued before the repealing t, t it i
[1878]). not appear hether r t t e r l t r tt
However, it is necessary to distinguish sharply the biJls before t e r l. t l
between cases where the exe ption is held binding, statute i sti tit t t t t en
there being a consideration upon hich t e c tract t t t t
can be based, and cases here t e la ff ri t r l, ti . ]u
exemption is construed to be a ere gratuity, repeal- tice a is, i ti g tially
able at any time. In Grand Lodge v. e rleans si ilar state f f ts i . l
(166 U. S. 146 [18g6]) , it appears that the legisla- allace, - [r ]), i : at i
ture of Louisiana had passed an act exe pting the as til it ra n t t t , tract
hall of a certain Grand Lodge fro taxation so t een the tate a d e er teholder t ,
long as it was occupied by a certain order of obliging the tate to recei e t t s f r t s,
Masons. The asons were already in occupation cannot ad it f serious sti . ,~
of the hall when the law was passed, but, in reliance a transaction t fit i t l t e
upon this law, went to considerable expense in re- parties. he bank get the interest t e tes s
pairing the hall. It was held that inas uch as the long as they are r , t e lder f
law provided in no way for an acceptance of its the biJls has a ready a d c venient e f ying
terms, and since, therefore, it could not be said taxes. e t t i , t erefore, the arter
that there was a consideration, the exemption as a creating the bank f e essee, od i era-
bounty, revocable at will. r. Justice Bro n said: tion, contract ith the illholders t 'Teceive r
" If the act of 1855 be regarded as a contract ithin the the a er f the ank for ll t es they ed
Dartmouth College v. oodward (4 heat. 518), the State. ntil t l islature, in e roper
then it is clear that the exe ption fro taxation ay, notifies the public that the arantee thus
was valid and beyond the po er of the legislature furnished has been ithdrawn, ch contract is
to abrogate. * * * To ake such a contract, binding pon t e tate and it in t e rotection
however, there is the same necessity for a considera- of the onstitution of the ited tates. *
tion that there would be if it were a contract be- The guarantee is in no sense a personal one. t
tween private parties. If the law be a ere offer attaches to the note - is part of it, s uch so as
of a bounty, it may be withdrawn at any ti e, not- if ritten on the ack f it - goes ith the note
withstanding the recipients of such bounty may everywhere, and invites everyone o as taxes
have incurred expense upon the faith of such offer" to pay to take it."
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These cases are similar in principle to the cases found between the State and the appointee, so as
where a State itself issues bonds and the law author- to make the statute irrepealable. Accordingly it was
izing the bond issue makes the coupons receivable held in Hall v. Wisconsin (03 U. S. 5 [188o])
in payment of debts due the State. In such cases that a law, under the provisions of which certain
it is uniformly held that a contract results between parties were employed for a fixed period and for a
the State and the holders of the bonds (McCullock fixed compensation, to make a geological survey of
v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102 [1898]; Hartman v. the State, was irrevocable. The commission of sur-
Greenhow, 102 U. S. 679 [i88o]). veyors, the persons who were appointed under the
statute, were not State officers. Mr. Justice
A Contract Distinguished from an Office. Swayne, in delivering the opinion, said: "The term
The question whether a State has a right to repeal civil officers * * * embraces only those officers
or amend a statute, under the terms of which in whom a portion of the sovereignty" (govern-
persons have been appointed or employed, depends mental authority?) "is vested, or to whom the
upon whether the statute in question has created enforcement of municipal regulations, or the control
an office or authorized a contract. The grant of an of the general interests of society is confided."
office, like the charter of a public corporation, is a
delegation of governmental authority and revocable
at pleasure by the State, on the principle that where
authority is vested in the legislature by the Consti-
tution of a State, it is impossible for the legislature
by contract or any other means to deprive itself
of its inherent prerogatives. The law creating an
office, therefore, may be repealed, or the salary of the
incumbent reduced during his term, without impair-
ing the obligation of a contract. Thus in the case
of Butler v. Pennsylvania (Io Howard, 417 [1850]),
where it appeared that the statute, under which
certain canal commissioners had been appointed, had
been amended during the commissioners' term of
office, so as to reduce the rate of their compensa-
tion, it was held that the original statute had
created an office, and that, therefore, the amending
act was not unconstitutional as impairing the obliga-
tion of a contract. Mr. Justice )aniel, in delivering
Quasi-contracts.
The question as to how far a quasi-contract, i. e.,
a contract implied in law, may be considered a con-
tract within the meaning of the Constitution, seems,
tinder the decisions of the Supreme Court, to be an
open one. It is fair to say, however, that if the
obligation imposed by law is in the nature of a stat-
tttory obligation, the law tinder which the quasi-
contract right has arisen may not be repealed so as
to impair rights already vested under its provisions.
Thus where public offices are abolished, it is held
that the officer is entitled to recover for his services
rendered before the repeal of the law by virtue of
which his office had existed at the rate of compen-
sation fixed in that law. After services have been
rendered under a law, resolution or ordinance which
fixes the rate of compensation, there arises an im-
plied contract to pay for those services at that rate.
the opinion of the court, said: " We have already This contract is complete, its obligation is perfect
shown that the appointment to and tentire of an and it is beyond the operation of a repealing act
office created for the public use, and the regulation (Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury. I16 U. S. 131 [1885];
of the salary affixed to such an office, do not fall Butler v. Pennsylvania, io Howard, 402 [1850]).
within the section of the Constitution relied on by The principle is well illustrated by the case of
the plaintiffs in error; do not come within the im- Steamship Co. v. Joliffe (2 Wallace, 457 [1864]).
port of the term contract, or, in other words, the It appears that Joliffe, a pilot, had tendered his
vested, private, personal rights thereby intended to services to the Steamship Company, and upon the
be protected. They are functions appropriate to that refusal of the company to accept them he became
class of powers and obligations by which govern- entitled, under a statttte of California, to half-pilot-
mentR are enabled. and are called upon to foster age fees. The statute under which the half-pilotage
and promote the general good: functions, therefore. fees were claimed was subsequently repealed in form
which governments cannot be presuled to have I by a law which substantially re-enacted all the pro-
surrendered, if, indeed, they can, tinder any cir- !visions of the original statute. And, although the
cunm-tances. be justified in surrendering them" case went off on the ground that the original statute
(Accord: Connor v. New York, i Selden [N. Y.]. had not, in fact, been repealed, it was pointed out
285 [185I]; Warner v. People, 7 Hill [N. Y.], 81 that even if such had been the case, Joliffe's claim,
[I844] ; see., also. United States v. Hlartwell, 6 Val- being a contract right within the protection of the
lace, 393 [I867] ; Hare, American Constitutional contract clause, would not have been affected.
Law, vol. t, 6,;o. and State decisions there collected; Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the
United States v. Maurice, 2 Brockenbrough [I823]). coturt, said: "The transaction in the latter case,
If. however, a statute authorizing the employment between the pilot and the master or owners, cannot
of a person does not involve the delegation of gov- be strictly termed a contract, but it is a transaction
ernmental functions, but looks rather to the to which the law attaches similar consequences; it is
performance of services, the end or accomplishment a quasi-contract. * * *' In such case the party
of which may be a governmental function, but the makes no promise on the subject; but the law 'con-
actual doing of which requires the exercise of no stilting the interests of morality' implies one; and
governmental authority, then a contract may be the liability thus arising is said to be a liability
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upon an implied contract. The claim for the half-
pilotage fees stands upon substantially similar
grounds. * * " When a right has arisen upon a
contract or transaction in the nature of a contract
authorized by statute, and has been so far perfected
that nothing remains to be done by the party assert-
ing it, the repeal of the statute does not affect it,
or an action for its enforcement."
However, as to judgments, another species of
quasi-contracts, the law seems to be settled that
they are not within the protection of the constitu-
tional prohibition under discussion. In a dictum
in the case of Garrison v. New York (21 Wallace,
203 [1874]), it was doubted whether a judgment,
not founded upon an agreement, express or implied,
is a contract within the meaning of the
Constitution.
This dictum of the court was adopted as law in
the later case of Louisiana v. New Orleans (IO9
U. S. 288 [I8831). In this case it appeared that the
State legislature had passed a law taking away from
the city of New Orleans the power to raise taxes
to a sufficient aniount to pay certain judgments
which the relator held against the city. The legis-
lation so limiting the taxing power of the munici-
pality had been passed after the judgments had
been acquired, and it was sought to have it declared
unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the
judgments in question. It was held, however, that
the judgments were not contract within the meaning
of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Field, who de-
livered the opinion, said: "A judgment for damages,
estimated in money, is sometimes called by the text-
writers a specialty or contract of. record, because
it establishes a legal obligation to pay the amount
recovered; and, by fiction of law, a promise is im-
plied where such legal obligation exists. It is on
this principle that an action c.r contractu will lie
upon a judgment (Chitty on Contracts [Perkins'
Ed.], 87). But this fiction cannot convert a trans-
action wanting the assent of the parties into one
which necessarily implies it. * * * The prohibi-
tion of the federal Constitution was intended to
secure the observance of good faith in the stipulation
of parties against State action. Where a trans-
action is not based upon the assent of the parties it
cannot be said that any faith is pledged with respect
to it, and no case arises for the operation of the
prohibition."
It is submitted that any distinction between a
statutory obligation like that in Steamship Co. v.
Joliffe (supra) and in Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury
(supra), and a judgment is entirely unfounded in
principle. Both are equally obligations imposed on
parties, regardless of their intention, and in many
cases in spite of their actual dissent. In both in-
stances the parties are bound, not because of their
assent or because they have willed to be bound, but
because the law has imposed the obligation
(Keener, Quasi-contracts, 16). It is is difficult, then,
to see why the court should distinguish between
the two cases merely because of the difference of
form in which the quasi-contractual obligation ap-
pears in the cases.
Marriage.
Notwithstanding the dicta of both Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Story, in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward (4 Wheaton, 650, 721 app.), that
marriage might well be considered a contract within
the meaning of the contract clause, and that, there-
fore, a State legislature could not dissolve a
marriage, unless there had been a breach on either
side, it may be stated as a principle of law, now well
settled, that marriage is a civil status rather than
a contract. A legislative divorce, in consequence,
would not be invalid as impairing the obligation
of contracts (i Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, sees.
3, 667-669, and State decisions there collected; see,
also, 3 Parsons on Contracts, 545; 2 Wharton on
Contracts, sec. io69).
It is to be noted, however, that the point never
seems to have been raised for decision before the
Supreme Court; but the principle of law that
marriage is a status is so clearly sound, as demon-
strated in the opinions of the learned commentators
above cited, that there can scarcely be room for
doubt as to the disposition that tribunal would make
of the question.
State Constitutions.
That the fiction of the political science of the eigh-
teenth century, by which a Constitution was con-
sidered a contract, should have survived to the last
quarter of the nineteenth century with sufficient
vigor to form the basis of an arguiment before the
Supreme Court of the United States seems almost
incomprehensible. Yet such is, in fact, the case.
In Church v. Kelsey (21 U. S. 282 [1886]) it was
urged by counsel that, as the Constitution of a State
is the " fundamental contract made beween the col-
lective body of citizens and each individual citizen,"
a State statute, which violates the State Constitution
is a law impairing the obligation of contracts. It
was held, however, that a State Constitution, being
the fundamental law adopted by the people for their
government, was not a contract within the meaning
of the Constitution of the United States.
To summarize the conclusions reached after our
review of the cases, it may be said:
(i) Any persons capable of entering into con-
tractual obligations at common law may be
parties to a contract which is within the
meaning of the Constitution. Thus the
contract may be
(a) Between individuals.
(b) Between a State in its corporate
capacity and an individual or
individuals.
(c) Between two States; or
(d) Between the United States govern-
ment and a State
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(2) A grant of land is a contract within the mean-
ing of the Constitution, and, therefore, even
before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, could not be revoked by a
State.
(a) But it seems that, although a State
could not, in terms, annul a
grant, it could, in fact, divest a
grantee of property accruing to
him under the grant.
(3) A grant of a corporate charter or a franchise
is a contract within the contract clause, and
the law granting the charter is, therefore,
irrepealable.
(a) However, in the case of a franchise,
unless an exclusive privilege is
expressly granted, there is
nothing to prevent a State from
effectually destroying its grant by
giving the same privilege to
another party
(b) But a State cannot grant away
irrevocably its governmental au-
thority, either by a formal char-
ter, irrepealable in terms, or by
a license given upon considera-
tion. Thus(x) a State eannot hnrter
no distinguishable principle, has refused to
consider a quasi-contract in the form of a
judgment, as within the protection of the
contract clause.
(6) Although the point has never been raised for
decision before the Supreme Court, there
seems to be no question, as a matter of
principle, but that marriage is a status,
rather than a contract. It cannot, there-
fore, be considered as within the meaning
of that term as employed in the
Constitution.
(7) ,\ State Constitution is not a contract; a
State law, therefore, violating a State Con-
stitution, is not voil under the federal
Constitution as impairing the obligation of
contracts
VA. UNDERHILL MOORE.
NLw YORK CITY, August, i901.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW DURING
THE MIDDLE AGES, ESPECIALLY IN
FRANCE AND ENGLAND.
By GEO. D. FERGUSON.
a)ay its police power. Gibbon, in the forty-fourth chapter of his very
(y) It cannot exempt by con- remarkable work, that chapter in which he treats
tract any property of the development of Roman law, makes the very
from the exercise of suggestive remark that the laws of a nation form the
its power of eminent most instructive portion of its history. This remark
domain, is. after all, little more than the reiteration of what
(z) But a State can, upon had been said long before both by Plato and
anomalous principles, Aristotle. But few men were more capable than
make a contract within Gibbon of forming a clear and unprejudiced opinion
the protection of the on the subject, or of tracing the development of the
federal Constitution to Roman law from the Twelve Tables down to the
exempt property from Ppndects of Justinian. He saw how clearly that
taxation. developllent was bound up with the growth of the
(c) The stipulation in the charters of Roman people, and that the legal development could
banking corporations that their not be separated from the development of their
notes shall be receivable for all social and national life.
debts due the State, constitutes Arnold, the German legist, in his "Cultur und
a contract between the State and Rechtsleben," expresses this idea in another way
a holder of the notes. when he says: "It is perfectly evident that the
state of the laws in its dependence on the other ele-(4) Although a law creating an office is revocable I ments of life can only be simply the expression of
at the will of the legislature, if a statute the contemporary culture of the people. And it is
authorizing the employment of a person quite true that each stage, not merely in the world's
does not involve the delegation of govern- history, but in the history of each nation, has been
mental authority, but looks rather to the marked ly the existence of characteristic laws, and
performance of services, not requiring the their embodiment in corresponding institutions, and,
exercise of governmental power, then a therefore, a study of these laws must reveal a
contract may come into existence between picture of the time at which they were in force."
the State and the appointee, so as to make In proportion as man emerges out of a state of
a repeal of the statute tnconstitutional as savagery and progresses towards civilization, so his
impairing the obligation of contracts, relations of life become more complex, and the
(5) A qtasi-contract in the nature of a statutory social organization needs to be regulated by laws
obligation is a contract within the meaning adapted to his improved social development. If
of the Constitution; but the court, upon we examine the statute book of any of the civilized
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(c) The stipulation in the charters of
banking corporations that their
notes shall be receivable for all
debts due the State, constitutes
a contract between the State and
a holder of the notes. hen s s: It is rfectly i ent that e
state of the laws in its dependence on the other ele-
Although a law creating an office is revocable Iments of lifc can only be simply the expression of
at the will of the legislature, if a statute: the contemporary culture of the people. And it is
authorizing the employment of a person I quite true that each stage, not merely in the world's
does not involve the delegation of govern- history, but in the history of each nation, has been
mental authority, but looks rather to the I marked by the existence of characteristic laws, and
perfo:mance of services, not requiring the: their embodiment in corresponding institutions, and,
exercIse of governmental power, then a I therefore, a study of these laws must reveal a
contract may come into existence between' picture of the time at which they were in force."
the State and the appointee, so as to make In proJlortion as man emergc's out of a state of
a repeal of the statute unconstitutional as savagcry and progresses towards civilization, so his
impairing thc obligation of contracts. relations of life become more complex, and the
A quasi-contract in the nature of a statutory social organization needs to be regulated by laws
obligation is a contract within the meaning adapted to his improved social development. If
of the Constitution; but the court, upon we examine the statute book of any of the civilized
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